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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

BOYD WARD,

)
Petitioner,

-vs-

)

CASE NO. 890347

RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal
corporation; et al.,
Respondents.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Supreme Court on Certiorari to
the Court of Appeals.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Judicial Review of action of the Governing Body of the
City of Richfield in dismissing Plaintiff (referred to herein as
"Ward") as Chief of Police.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Although we believe the Appellant Wardfs Statement of
Issues for Review to be prolix it will, except for our General
Statement,
Appellant.

be

answered

in

the

numerical

order

assigned

by

To the extent they are repetitive we have combined

them in our responses:
ISSUE I;

THE DISTRICT COURT EXERCISING DISCRETION VESTED IN
IT RULED THAT TO VOID THE CITY'S ACTION TO REMOVE
WARD WOULD ENDANGER THE PUBLIC GOOD.

ISSUE II;

THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED SETTLED UTAH LAW THAT
COINCIDED WITH FORMER §10-6-32, U.C.A. 1953,
ITSELF RESTATED ELSEWHERE IN THE MUNICIPAL CODE
AUTHORIZING DISMISSALS.

ISSUE III;

NO STATUTE, INCLUDING §52-4-6, REQUIRES FORMAL
ACTION BY THE GOVERNING BODY TO DISMISS AN
EMPLOYEE TO BE LISTED ON THE MEETING AGENDA.

ISSUE IV:

NO ACTION WAS TAKEN IN A CLOSED MEETING TO DISMISS
WARD.

ISSUE V:

APPEAL PROCEDURES UNDER §§10-3-1105 AND 10-3-1106
EXPRESSLY EXCLUDE (1) POLICE OFFICERS; AND (2)
DEPARTMENT HEADS; WARD BEING BOTH.

ISSUE VI:

ACCEPTING THE STIPULATED FACTS AND APPELLANT'S
ARGUMENT OF FACTS, THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT (WARD) WAS STILL
BASED ON UNCONTRADICTED AFFIDAVITS ESTABLISHING
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS.

ISSUE VII;

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY ARTICULATED THE
EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETING
ACT WHICH IS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO REQUIRE NO
CONSTRUCTION.

ISSUE VIII;

WARD'S PHANTOM "RICHFIELD CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL". IF ANYTHING AT
ALL, WAS AUTHORED BY, AND PROVIDES EXCLUSIVE MEANS
OF APPEALING DISCHARGE ONLY TO AND AS FAR AS, WARD
AS CHIEF OF POLICE - IN OTHER WORDS HIMSELF.

ISSUE IX:

THE TRIAL COURT'S TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER WAS
RECALLED BY THE ISSUING COURT ON THE BASIS THAT
ENFORCEMENT WOULD BE INIMICAL TO PUBLIC WELLBEING.
The following are additional Issues which the Court

might consider in arriving at its decision on Certiorari:
ISSUE X:

EVEN IF THE BERUBE1 STANDARDS WERE OFFENDED IN
THIS CASE (WHICH WE SUBMIT THEY ARE NOT) BERUBE
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY TO 1981.

ISSUE XI:

THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETING ACT (CH. 4, TITLE 52,
U.C.A. 1953) IS NOT A DUE PROCESS STATUTE.

^erube vs. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989)
2

ISSUE XII:

THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING; THAT ISSUE IS RES
JUDICATA.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS

Title

52, Chapter

4, Utah

Code

Annotated,

1953

as

amended (Open and Public Meeting Act):
***

52-4-3. Meetings open to the public - Exceptions.
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed
pursuant to Sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5.
***

52-4-6. Public notice of meetings.
(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings that
are scheduled in advance over the course of a year
shall give public notice at least once each year of its
annual meeting schedule as provided in this section.
The public notice shall specify the date, time, and
place of such meetings.
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Subsection (1) of this section, each public body shall
give not less than 24 hours* public notice of the
agenda, date, time and place of each of its meetings.
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by:
(a) posting written notice at the principal
office of the public body, or if no such office
exists, at the building where the meeting is to be
held; and
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of
general
circulation
within
the
geographic
jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local
media correspondent.
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is
necessary for a public body to hold an emergency
meeting to consider matters of an emergency or urgent
nature, the notice requirements of Section 52-4-6(2)
may be disregarded and the best notice practicable
given.
No such emergency meeting of a public body
shall be held unless an attempt has been made to notify
all of its members and a majority votes in the
affirmative to hold the meeting.
***

3

52-4-8.
Suit to void final action - LimitationExceptions.
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3
and 52-4-6 is voidable by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Suit to void final action shall be
commenced within 90 days after the action except that
with respect to any final action concerning the
issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of
indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days
after the action.
***

Rule 65Af Utah Rules of Civil Procedure [Temporary
Restraining Orders; Essential Conditions and Recitals]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

On April 2, 1981, the Richfield City Council held

a public meeting after promulgating an agenda as, to the extent
and in form required by §52-4-6 (1981).

The agenda did not list

consideration of Ward's discharge as Chief of Police.
2.

Following discussion of items on the agenda, the

Council voted to hold a closed meeting and invited Ward to join
them in discussing his position as Chief of Police.

The Council

was concerned about several recent resignations within the police
department.

Discussion of Ward's termination ensued and the

Council decided to terminate Ward.

The Council resumed open

session and formally voted to discharge Ward effective April 3,
1981.
3.

On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted a written request

to the Council for an administrative appeal pursuant to §§10-31105

and

-1106

(1981).

The request was

immediately denied

because these Code sections exclude members of police departments
as well as department heads; as the Court of Appeals held (776
4

P. 2d at 97).

Ward did nothing thereafter until threats were made

by his lawyer to Richfieldfs attorney that a lawsuit would be
filed.

On June 5, 1981, the Council again promulgated notice

that a special meeting would be held on June 8, 1981, and
specifically mentioned

in the Agenda the consideration of a

motion to ratify its action taken at the April meeting.
agenda

included Ward's discharge as an

item

This

for discussion.

Prior to the meeting, Ward served the Council with a temporary
restraining order, to restrain it from taking any further action
against

him.

Strictly

construing

the temporary

restraining

order, the Council ratified its decision to terminate Ward and
took no further action against Ward.
4.

On

June

17,

1981,

the

trial

court

held

a

preliminary injunction hearing and determined that pursuant to
the removal statute for chiefs of police, §10-3-911 (repealed
1987), it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter.

[§10-3-911

stated in part that " [t]he chief of police or fire department of
the cities may at any time be removed, without a trial, hearing
or

opportunity

to

be

heard, by

the board

of

commissioners

whenever in its opinion the good of the service will be served
thereby."]
5.

Ward appealed the trial court's decision to the

Utah Supreme Court and this Court decided in Ward vs. Richfield
City, 716 P.2d 265

(Utah 1984), that the trial court did have

jurisdiction because §10-3-911 did not pertain to third class
cities.

On remand, the trial court, based upon irrefutable
5

affidavits, granted summary judgment in favor of Richfield City.
The court ruled the April 2nd Agenda listed "other business"
under which personnel matters were considered and that it was not
in the public interest to void the Council's action at either the
April 2 or the June 8, 1981, meeting.
6.

Ward contends on appeal that the Council:

(1)

violated the Public Meetings Act on April 2, 1981; (2) on June
8th acted in violation of the temporary restraining order; (3)
wrongfully denied Ward the right to appeal his discharge; and (4)
he

is

entitled

to

reinstatement,

back

pay

and

$600,000.00

damages.
7.
Appeals.

The Trial Court was affirmed by the Court of

776 P.2d 93 (1989).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Boyd Ward, prior to 1981, was appointed Chief of Police
by

then

Mayor

Kendrick

Harward.

Richfield City Council concurred.
On April 2,

In

that

appointment

the

(Complaint 1(3; R.3)

1981, during a regular meeting of the City

Council for which an agenda was posted and delivered as required
by the Open Meeting Law

(Ch. 4, Title 52, U.C.A., 1953) an

executive session was held to which Ward was personally invited
and during which he was interviewed and his ability to lead the
police force was considered and evaluated.

Six members of the

police force had been fired or resigned within recent months and
a majority of the remaining members of the force had expressed
6

their determination to resign immediately unless Wardfs services
as chief of police were terminated.

(R. 234)

The minutes of the meeting of April 2, 1981, show that
the Council and Mayor went into executive session to which Ward
was invited.

[R. 229, 230 (uncontradicted Affidavit of then

Mayor Kendrick Harward, now deceased) and passim]
In careful
nature

was

taken

observance of §52-4-4 no action of any
either

by

ordinance,

resolution,

regulation or order during the executive session.

rule,

(R. 230)

Nad R. Brown had been appointed to the City Council to
fill a vacancy in February, 1981.
with the remaining

City

abstained from the vote.

His appointment was unanimous

Council and Mayor.
(R. 226)

(R. 225)

He

Had the Council been disposed

summarily to dismiss Ward they would have chosen a new councilman
pre-dedicated to that purpose.
After the executive session was concluded the Council
went back into open session and it was officially determined by
the Mayor and its Council, with Nad Brown abstaining, that the
services of Ward as chief of police should be terminated.

(R.

225; Harward Affidavit)
Ward was immediately notified of his termination and
was told by the Mayor that "he could be heard by the City Council
which Ward expressly and unqualifiedly declined".

(R. 236-

emphasis added)
Ward waited two months (3 meetings) before he made any
move.

Demonstrative

of Wardfs disinterest
7

in a hearing

is

graphic in his failure to express any desire for City Council
review until the second monthly meeting after April (June 8th)
although he did write a letter citing an inapplicable statute.
(R. 47)

He

ignored

(if he wanted

to appear

to argue his

dismissal) two meetings in May and only reacted when the City,
after being threatened with a lawsuit, gave redundant notice of
the re-affirmation Agenda to which Ward responded with an ex
parte

Temporary

Restraining

Order

secured

without

notice.

Although Ward knew the City's legal counsel was within minutes of
the

Courthouse

Ward's

counsel omitted

to notify him.

This

manifests an intention on Ward's part not to be reinstated but
rather to extort money damages in punitive form from Richfield.
Ward excludes from his enumeration and description of
prior proceedings this extraordinary ex parte appearance before
Judge Tibbs which alone (albeit numerous other reasons exist any
one of which) demonstrates

sufficient

reason to sustain the

Summary Judgment later entered by the Trial Court:

Ward's only

significant claim is that the Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO")
which was dissolved when the Court heard the facts had forever
precluded

the Governing

Body

from dismissing

Ward; in other

words, the TRO was a final judgment.
Having both dissolved the TRO and held that the June 8,
1981 meeting was valid (R. 387) the Trial Court left standing an
unchallengeable dismissal of Ward which was effected regularly,
properly, and decisively on June 8, 1981 and, as recited in the
decision of the Trial Court entered on September 29, 1986 8

The Court finds that it would net be in the
public interest to void the action taken by
the Richfield City Council on April 2, 1981,
and as ratified *y
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3,

IM " Temporary

Restraining

Order

was

not

properly endorsed by the Clerk as required by Rule 65A.

(Id.)

[The entire text of Rule 65A is annexed as a part of
the Appendix (pp. i.l).]
We have attached the 2-page Order granting Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment as Appendix pp. ii.l and ii.2.
Court

issuing the Temporary Restraining Order

should never have been made effective.

The

found that it

In fact, to prevent

complete civil disorder Judge Tibbs struck from the TRO furnished
him ex parte a paragraph which would have reinstated Ward.

(R.

10)2
On June 8, 1981 at a meeting unchallengeable on any
grounds Ward was discharged as chief of police as determined by
the Trial Court.

Uncontradicted affidavits show that the Mayor

and City Council voted to terminate Ward and that the dismissal
was not malicious or in wanton disregard of Ward's rights.

(R.

e.g. 229-234 and passim, 235-254)
These

affidavits

on

file,

totally

uncontradicted,

demonstrate that the termination of Ward was reasonable, not
arbitrary

nor

capricious

nor

with

intent

to

damage

Ward

personally nor to injure his reputation.

The affidavits show

that his reputation suffered no injury.

Those affidavits are

uncontested (he was subsequently elected Constable).
Ward is raising many issues on appeal that were not
presented to the Trial Court including the so-called "Richfield

2

It is curious that Ward's attorney's choice of words was
"reinstated".
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The reason he wishes to establish a

11

department hiatus in cities of a third class is obvious since
§10-3-1105 excludes "members of police departments" as well as
"heads of departments" from discharge or transfer procedures
provided in the following Section -1106.
Section 10-3-813 provides as follows:
10-3-813.
General administrative powers of
all municipalities.
The governing body of
each municipality shall from time to time
prescribe the powers and duties to be
performed
by
the
superintendents,
supervisors, department directors and all of
its officers and employees. [Emphasis added]
Section 10-3-814 provides as follows:
10-3-814. Personnel assigned to one or more
departments.
The governing body of each
municipality may assign any individual to one
or more positions in one or more departments.
Both of the foregoing
municipality".

statutes use the term

Section 10-1-104(1) defines

"each

"municipality" as

***any city of the first class, city of the second class, city of
the third class or town in the State of Utah.

[Emphasis added]

Section 10-3-811 provides as follows:
10-3-811. Members of the governing body may
be appointed to administration in cities of
the third class and towns. The mayor of any
city of the third class or the mayor of any
town may, with the advice and consent of the
majority of the governing body, assign or
appoint any member or members of the
governing body to administer one or more
departments of the municipality and shall by
ordinance
provide
the
salary
for the
administrator or administrators.
At page 39 of Ward's brief he makes the illogical
argument, expressly

contrary to statute, that Richfield City

cannot have a "department for its police".

From this position,

a] ready

untenable,
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,c_are

>

(192c

m

ir is r - a d *, p ' r h f i e i ; * - v

predictability

categor *

* J

background

-^

employment-at-will rule, lists several considerations

(771 P.2d

at 1041) for adjusting to a change:
(a)

Contravention of a recognized and established

Hutchison (692 P. 2d 772 - Utah 1984) defines the public

policy.

policy of the State of Utah to be consistent with the conditions
applicable to Ward's dismissal.
(b)
employment.

Express

or

implied

contract

term

for

Ward's employment is distinguished neither by any

statute nor a writing.

This is not only spelled out by the

statutes but admitted by Ward's own Policies (Appendix iii.l and
iii.2; iv.l and iv.2).
of 1977

Section 10-3-1105 of the Municipal Code

(L'77 Ch 48 §3) excludes members of police departments

and all heads of departments, for that matter, from statutorily
supplied

tenure.

Ward

argued

in Ward vs. Richfield

City

I

that he

was not a member of a department because Richfield City had a
marshal1

or chief of police rather than a police department.

However, Ward must make himself a member of a department to come
within

Departmental

Policy

No. 10.

As

the Court of

Appeals

correctly observed, Ward's argument is palpably self-destructive.
Treating the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing,

paramount

in

this

expectations of the parties.

doctrine

is

(771 P.2d at 1046)

the

reasonable

An appropriate

statement of the Court is that:
Care must be exercised to avoid eclipsing the
rule by extending the exception. 771 P.2d 1047
On that same page the footnote enumerates five possibly
relevant factors:
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Here

again,
j5

1 »*i >uiidi
-he

privacy

;.bvk.;:>,

and

immediate

polemics between the chief and his subordinates were
insoluble.

The

Governing

Body,

during

lengthy

confidential interviews with Ward both for months prior
to, and in the executive session of the meeting itself,
were down-played

to

reduce public

embarrassment

to

Ward.
(vi)

Discrimination

constitutionally

by

impermissible

the

employer

reasons.

We

for

do not

treat this factor since it appears inapplicable to this
issue.
Other

possible

factors

which

we

most

respectfully

advance as demoralizing to the force and to the City are (a)
insubordination, and (b) categorical refusal of Ward to alleviate
tremendous pressures upon the City.

Mayor Kendrick Harward (now

deceased) deposed that Ward was asked to relax excessive and
noxious disciplining of Ward's subordinates.

(R. 233)

The

departmental head of public safety, Duane Wilson, defended Ward's
performance as chief of police and tried

(unsuccessfully) to

encourage

with

Ward

policemen.

to

attenuate

displeasure

Ward

by

his

(R. 250-253)

A

negative

demonstrate.

proposition

However,

the

is

negative

sometimes
of

this

impossible

to

issue

be

may

established by what is offered supporting the existence of the
phenomenon to be repelled.

Ward devotes Issues V through VIII

(pp. 25-41) of his brief to the claim that Richfield City adopted
a

manual

relating

to

termination
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]

Restraining
- Court heard
t

Although the TRO was never violated by Richfield and
against Ward's argument to the contrary, the District Court
concurred

in that conclusion; nevertheless, Ward seems to be

arguing that

if an

injunction

is outstanding

any

acts done

inconsistent with the restraints expressed in the injunction are
void.

There are no cases, procedural rules, or any authorities

stating that such is the result.
The thesis of Ward is palpably unsound:

if the Open

Meeting Law were not observed then Richfield is forever barred
from acting upon even any measure however momentous, in a legal
way.

In other words, Ward is complaining that Richfield handled

the meeting of April 2, 1981, improperly and having done so is
precluded from ever doing it in a proper way.

To follow this

reasoning

flood-destroyed

bridge

if Richfield

but

failed

desired

to

be,

to
in

restore
its

a

haste

to

authorize

reconstruction, state that purpose in an agenda, Richfield would
be

forever

foreclosed

from

restoring

the

bridge.

He

is

complaining that once Richfield made an error they can never
correct it.

He is contending that until the litigation was

settled there could be no chief of police.

It is vital that in

the TRO Judge Tibbs deleted language Ward's counsel had inserted
that Ward be reinstated.

(R. 10)

The sensitivity

of the position

illustrated by the

affidavits stating that the chief of police had to be replaced
otherwise the entire force would resign manifests the plight of
Richfield on April 2, 1981.

(R. 234)
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had already

done ^ 1

In

State

ex

rel

Cooper

vs.

Warnock,

134

P . 2d

706,

16

Wash.2d 697 and in Vol. 43A C.J.S. at p. 640, Iniunctions §290 it
is stated that officials are guilty of contempt in entering into
new contracts only where they were enjoined from implementing a
prior one or are in contempt only if a new one is subject to the
same objection.

As an illustration the C.J.S. text recites that:

"officials restrained from expending money
under a construction contract, bids for which
have been irregularly advertised for, do not
violate the restraining order by cancelling
the contract, readvertising properly for bids
and entering into a new contract."
(43A
C.J.S. at 640)
More

importantly

and

consistent

with

Richfield1s

position that it may (and should) rectify any wrong that existed
in the proceedings, is reinforced in the same volume of Corpus
Juris which states at p. 640:
Where the enforcement of an ordinance has
been enjoined on the ground that certain
provisions of the ordinance are invalid, the
passage and enforcement of a new ordinance on
the same subject, without such invalid
provisions, are not violations of the
injunction.
THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED SETTLED UTAH LAW THAT
COINCIDED WITH FORMER §10-6-32, U.C.A. 1953,
ITSELF RESTATED ELSEWHERE IN THE MUNICIPAL CODE
AUTHORIZING DISMISSALS.

ISSUE II;

and
THE TRIAL COURT'S TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER WAS
RECALLED BY THE ISSUING COURT ON THE BASIS THAT
ENFORCEMENT WOULD BE INIMICAL TO PUBLIC WELLBEING.

ISSUE IX:

In

Hutchison vs. CartmighL

692

P. 2d

772,

(Utah,

Nov.

14, 1984) per Justice Zimmerman, the Utah Supreme Court, having
20

bv

then
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appointment
appointee
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:' t -i which

the author.] i / r o susfenJ
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in a
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i
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.hoLM^.-*, ^.vi^-Lvje/ or

hearing11 , because unless the statute on appointment or dismissal
expressly G O |h,v''>s f 'hat officer serves "at the pleasure" of
the appo

.
Hutchison

dismissed

claimed

in hit:* lawsuit

that

he had been

by the Sheriff who had no authorit ;, I'M

h -;> h - r

• -

.

.. "i was entitled

ffVi I

to notice and a

hearing.
Justice Zimmerman aL
i *i,nf i t e s :

thtnj;

This issue was considered
/ t'/tr

County

vs.

Board

oj

.

C )mmissioners

• „!:
of

itii/ /-<*** Ccwrt/.r. 71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783
(1928).
There the Court dealt with ^nc
question of vhether o jniy
commissioners
could suspend or disr;,] :>s deputy sheriffs
against the will of the sheriff,
***The
Court stated that unless otherwise controlled
by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss
is appurtenant to the power to appoint. When
an individual is appointed by an official,
"the office is held during the pleasure v f
the authority making the appointment and . .
no notice or charges or hearings are
required for the suspension or removal by the
authority appointing the officer."
at 596, ;-68 :.. +t ";-:M. [Emphasis added]
[For t :ie Ou;tt's convenience we have attached
the Hutchison Deci s i on hi I hi1 Ih mor'andujii |
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l I v.

This statement is not just the law of the case.

It is

the law of the State of Utah, broadly affecting all appointed
public safety personnel (e.g.: "when an individual is appointed
by an official the office is held during the pleasure of the
authority ***»).
"During the pleasure" is entirely different from merely
the necessity

to

remove

for cause

(Rogers vs. Congleton, 84 S.W.

521 [Ky.]) and gives the agency vested with authority of that
nature the "unlimited discretion" to effect termination. Taylor
vs. Spear, 238 P. 1038, 1043; 196 Cal. 709.

In London vs. City of

Franklin, 80 S.W. 514, 515; 118 Ky. 105, the Court said:
*** the officers named may be "removed at the
pleasure" of the city council. These words
have a well-defined legal meaning. The right
to "remove at pleasure" is an entirely
different thing from the right to remove for
cause.
To hold that the statute only
authorizes the council to remove for cause
would be to deny the words used by the
Legislature their ordinary meaning.
As
Commissioners

stated
of

Salt

in
Lake

Sheriff

of

County,

Salt
71

Lake

County

Utah

593,

vs.

Board

268

of

P.

783

(1928) :
When an individual is appointed by an
official the office is held during the
pleasure
of
the
authority
making
the
appointment, and ... no notice or charges or
hearings are required for the suspension or
removal by the authority appointing the
officer.
(Cited with approval in Hutchison
vs. Cartwright, 692 P. 2d 772 at 774 [Nov.
1984]).
Taylor vs. Gunderson, 154

P. 2d

653,

107

U

437

(1944)

holds that a chief of police in a third class city can be removed
22
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The Chief Justice wrote:

•**Since the statute expressly iequired cause
for removal and subsequently was changed so
as to eliminate the words expressly requiring
cause
for
removal
the
indication
quite
clearly is that the legislature intended to
eliminate the requirement that there be cause
for removal r>P a rity marshal.
in Uio ) ^ / / Muni-.:) pa ] roc.a .->r ' n -v-, other act

Nothing
has

ever
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~
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held

558

that

P . 2d
Plaintiff

] 307,
was

(Utah
f i i t 11 l e d

1976),
un

wherein

rights set forth in her contract of employment.

Ward had no

contract.
In this case, Ward has not pleaded any reasons by which
he has a right to retain his position as police chief, he has
cited no authority which prevents the council from terminating
him and, indeed, nothing in Utah law gives a police chief any
right

to

expect

continued

employment,

absent

any

other

consideration.
Sections 10-3-911 and 10-3-1106 are the only statutes
which confer any rights on municipal employees in cities of the
third class.

Section 10-3-1105 provides:

All appointive officers and employees of
municipalities, other than members of the
police departments, fire departments, heads
of departments, and superintendents shall
hold their employment without limitation of
time, being subject to discharge or dismissal
only as hereinafter provided.
[Emphasis
added]
Section 10-3-1106 provides that no officer or employee
covered by §10-3-1105 shall be discharged except pursuant to a
hearing and an appeal process set forth in §10-3-1106.
Section 10-3-1105 specifically exempts from the due
process and job protection provisions of §10-3-1106 members of
the police department and heads of departments.

Ward has been

exempted from statutory protection both as a member of the police
department and as a department head.
The

rule,

in

the

absence

expectation, is well settled that:
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of

statutory

tenure

or

. . . if municipal officers are appointed or
elected, as by a council or board, and a
definite term is not prescribed, the officer
holds at the will or pleasure of his superior
or the appointing or electing authority, and,
therefore, the power of removal may be
exercised at any time by such person or
agency.
Yorkley, Municipal Corporations,
§339, p. 68, 1957:
Where an appointed municipal or county
officer does not hold office for a fixed term
or under expressed or implied restrictions as
to the manner of his removal from office, it
is common for the Court to express his tenure
as being at the "pleasure11 [Sheriff vs.
Commissioners cited supra uses this term] of
the appointing power.
If a municipal or
county office is in fact held at the pleasure
of the appointing power, there seems to be no
doubt that the removal may be accomplished
without notice or hearing.
56 Am.Jur.2d,
Municipal Corporations, §333. See also Glenn
vs.

Town

of

Georgetown,

36

Colo.

App.

431,

543 P.2d 726 (1975), holding, absent an
applicable
state
statute
or
specific
ordinance, there is implicit in the power of
a city or town to fire the power to discharge
at any time without notice of written charges
or

a

hearing.

See

Ends

vs.

City

of

Boulder,

587 P.2d 39 (Nev. 1978).
In the instant case, Ward held the position of police
chief by appointment of the mayor and city council; he does not
hold for any term of office.

Section 10-3-1105 specifically

excludes the police chief from the administrative review provided
by §10-3-1106.
and council.

Ward holds the position at the will of the mayor
The only issue Ward could litigate on remand is

whether the mayor and council voted to terminate him and the
affidavits in this case conclusively dispose of that issue.
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ISSUE III:

NO STATUTE, INCLUDING §52-4-6, REQUIRES FORMAL
ACTION BY THE GOVERNING BODY TO DISMISS AN
EMPLOYEE TO BE LISTED ON THE MEETING AGENDA.

and
ISSUE IV:

NO ACTION WAS TAKEN IN A CLOSED MEETING TO DISMISS
WARD.
Wardfs principal claim is that Utah's "Sunshine Law"

was violated incident to his termination as chief of police.
In 1977 the Utah Legislature
Public

Meeting

Act;

popularly

titled

adopted
the

(references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953).

the Open and
"Sunshine

Law"

The Act's express

purpose is to keep the public informed (§52-4-1 and §52-4-3).

It

provides that meetings are open to the public (§52-4-3) and that
an agenda be delivered, not to the persons whose property or
rights are involved, but to the news media, not less than 24
hours before a meeting (§52-4-6).

The penalty for violation of

those requirements is that action taken is "voidable" by a Court
of competent jurisdiction (§52-4-8).

The Act does not establish

a procedure to be followed in dealing with private rights to
property, liberty, employment, or governmental regulation such as
taxation, zoning or public utility operation; nor with respect to
budgets or bonded indebtedness.

It is purely a statute providing

that interested persons can ascertain what public matters will be
considered and allow them to ascertain

(and publish if they

choose) how the members of the governing body voted.

Most

significantly for purposes of this action, it does not establish
any "right to be heard" or to participate in debate or to be
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represented by witnesses or legal counsel upon or in matters to
be considered by the public bodies regulated by the Sunshine Act.
In other words, it is informational in its objectives and it does
not provide any "procedural process" even for persons directly
affected by legislative acts of the governing body.
It is important to observe the sanction clause for
violations of the Open and Public Meeting law.

This is found in

§52-2-8 and does not provide that acts are void if there is a
violation of §52-4-3 or §52-4-6.

It provides they are voidable

by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Only if the Trial Court's

action in refusing to void a legislative action by a City's
Governing Body were arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical would it
be applicable.
Under no exaggeration of the facts can it be concluded
that either of those statutes was violated.

Section 52-4-3

states that every meeting is open to the public unless closed
pursuant to §52-4-5.
The meeting was closed by a unanimous vote of the
Council

and Mayor

(R. 226) to comply with

§52-4-4 and the

executive session convened by §52-4-5(a) allowing discussion of
the professional confidence of an individual to prevent harm to
that person's reputation.
Section 52-4-6 provides only for the statement of a
proposed agenda (stating only what the council intends to take up
as that intention is framed at the time the "agenda" is drawn
up) .

There is nothing in §52-4-6 which requires the agenda to
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state every item for discussion.
In this Court's ruling on June 17, 1981, the following
determination was made:
3. The Court finds that the Defendants had
the legal right to hold the meeting of April
2, 1981, and that during the course of the
open meeting the City Council went into a
closed meeting and that among the other
business was the determination to terminate
the Plaintiff as chief of police which was a
subject discussed at the closed portion of
the meeting and that in the ensuing open
portion of the meeting a minute entry was
filed and made of record terminating the
services of the Plaintiff as chief of police.
[Emphasis added]
The Supreme Court did not reverse this finding.

It

only said the "sole issue before this [the Supreme] Court is the
question of whether the Court had jurisdiction."
that Courts do have jurisdiction.

It is now clear

It also has jurisdiction to

grant Summary Judgment because Ward's claims do not entitle him
to any relief.
ISSUE V;

APPEAL PROCEDURES UNDER §§10-3-1105 AND 10-3-1106
EXPRESSLY EXCLUDE (1) POLICE OFFICERS; AND (2)
DEPARTMENT HEADS; WARD BEING BOTH.

and
ISSUE VIII:

WARD'S PHANTOM "RICHFIELD CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL". IF ANYTHING AT
ALL, WAS AUTHORED BY, AND PROVIDES EXCLUSIVE MEANS
OF APPEALING DISCHARGE ONLY TO AND AS FAR AS, WARD
AS CHIEF OF POLICE - IN OTHER WORDS HIMSELF.

The Mayor, with the advise and consent of the Council,
appointed Ward to the position of Richfield City chief of police,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §10-3-916 (1981).
Body had

the

authority

This Governing

to dismiss Ward, without
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a hearing,

notice, or cause.

In Hutchison vs. Cartwright, 692 P. 2d 772, 773-

774 (Utah 1984), the court held that unless otherwise controlled
by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss is appurtenant to the
power

to appoint.

official,

'the

"When an

office

is

individual

held

during

is appointed
the

pleasure

by an
of

the

authority making the appointment, and ... no notice or charges or
hearings

are required

for the suspension

authority appointing the officer.111
of

Salt

Lake

P. 783, 784
appointment

County

vs.

(1928)].
to

Board

of

or removal by the

Id. at 774 [quoting Sheriff
Commissioners,

71

Utah

593,

268

"The rule of common law was that the

municipal

office

carried

with

it

no

vested

property interest in continued employment, and such officers were
subject

to

otherwise

removal

without

prescribed."

(Wyo. 1984).

cause, reason

or hearing

Carlson vs. Bratton, 681

P. 2d

unless

1333, 1337

Since the Utah Supreme Court determined that §10-3-

911 did not apply, there is no statute explicitly governing the
dismissal of chiefs of police or city marshals in third class
cities.

Therefore, based on common law, we urge that the Mayor

and the Council had independent authority to discharge Ward,
without a hearing, notice, or cause.
Ward, nevertheless, contends that he has a right to
appeal his discharge under §§10-3-1105 and -1106.

Section 10-3-

1105 provides that "[a]11 appointive officers and employees of
municipalities, other than members of the police departments,
fire

departments, heads

of departments, and superintendents,

shall hold their employment without limitation of time, being
29

subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided,"
[Emphasis added]

Ward argues that he does not fall within the

exception because he is not a member of a "police department" per
se, but a city marshal with appointed assistants.

However, we

read §§10-3-1105 and -1106 as specifically excluding him.
sections

in

Title

interchangeably
Annotated

with

§10-3-918

10

use

"city

the

term

marshal."

(1986).

As

"chief

of

See, e.g.,

Chief

of

Other
police"

Utah

Police,

it

Code
is

inescapable that Ward is both a member of a "police department"
and the head of that "department".
Ward also argues that even if he
exceptions

to

§10-3-1105

because

he

is

a

falls within the
chief

of police,

nevertheless, the language in the second sentence of §10-3-1106
applies to "any officer."

Because these sections must be read

together and should harmonize with the purpose of the whole act,
Jensen

vs.

Intermountain

Health

Care,

Inc.,

679

P.2d

903,

906

(Utah

1984), we believe that the language "as hereinafter provided" in
§10-3-1105

specifically

modifies

the

sections

that

follow.

"Separate parts of [an] act should not be construed in isolation
from the rest of the act."
Authority, 618

P.2d

480,

Id.

481

See also Stahl vs. Utah Transit

(Utah

1980).

Therefore,

"any

officer" as appears in §10-3-1106 must mean any officer not
excluded

in §10-3-1105.

Ward vs. Richfield City, 776 P. 2d

and 97.
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at 96

ISSUE VI:

ACCEPTING THE STIPULATED FACTS AND APPELLANT'S
ARGUMENT OF FACTS, THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT (WARD) WAS STILL
BASED ON UNCONTRADICTED AFFIDAVITS ESTABLISHING
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS.
This Issue has been argued in the "General Statement".

Please see pages 13 through 17 of General Statement.
ISSUE VII:

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY ARTICULATED THE
EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETING
ACT WHICH IS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO REQUIRE NO
CONSTRUCTION.

To avoid repetition please see our argument under Issue
IIIf pages 26 through 29.
The following are additional Issues which the Court
should consider in arriving at its decision on Certiorari:
EVEN IF THE BERUBE STANDARDS WERE OFFENDED IN
THIS CASE (WHICH WE SUBMIT THEY ARE NOT) BERUBE
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY TO 1981.

ISSUE X:

This

Court

in Bembe made

two

pronouncements

which

imply that the Bembe rules are to be applied prospectively.
the lead opinion Justice Durham comprehensively

In

detailed the

development and establishment of the at-will rule in Utah then
concluded that:
Admittedly
the concept of good faith and
fair dealing is not susceptible to brightline definitions and tests.
It should
therefore be used sparingly and with caution.
When true injustice has been incurred, relief
should be provided. Care must be exercised to
avoid eclipsing the rule by expanding the
exception. (771 P.2d at 1047).
In Justice Zimmerman's opinion concurring in the result
stated:
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All that being said, we are reversing and
remanding this matter for trial and are
signaling a change in the employment-at-will
law of Utah. (771 P.2d at 1051).
Therefore Berube should not be interpreted in such a
way as to modify Hutchison vs. Cartwright.

ISSUE XI:

THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETING ACT (CH. 4, TITLE 52,
U.C.A. 1953) IS NOT A DUE PROCESS STATUTE.
As the Court of Appeals stated, 776 P.2d at 95:
The purpose of the Utah Open and Public
Meetings Act is to insure that the actions of
the State, its agencies, and political
subdivisions are conducted openly.
[See
Common

Cause

of

Utah

v.

Utah

Public

Serv.

Comm'n,
598
P.2d
1312
(Utah
1979).]
Political subdivisions, as defined in Utah
Code Ann. §10-1-201 (1981), include municipal
corporations and municipalities.
Utah Code
Ann. §10-3-601 (1981) provides that all
meetings of the governing body of each
municipality shall be held in compliance with
the provisions of the open and public
meetings law.
Ward contends that Richfield City failed to
comply with the agenda and notice provisions
of the open meetings law and that such
failure should void the action taken at the
April meeting. Ward argues that the subject
of his discharge should have been listed on
the agenda, even if discussions regarding him
were conducted in a closed meeting.
This
contention fails for two reasons. First, the
open meetings act designates certain subjects
which are exempt from discussion in open
meetings.
See section 52-4-5.
Where at
least two-thirds of the public body present
at an open meeting vote to hold a closed
meeting
to
discuss
the
character,
professional competence, or physical or
mental health of an individual, then a closed
meeting may be held.
See section 52-4-4.
The Council voted in the April open meeting
to sequester themselves to discuss Ward's
professional competence in compliance with
section 52-4-4.
The Council concluded the
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closed meeting with a unanimous vote, one
member
abstaining,
to
discharge
Ward.
Minutes of the closed meeting were recorded
and when the Council resumed open session, a
formal vote to discharge Ward was taken.
(776 P.2d 95).
ISSUE XII;

THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING; THAT ISSUE IS RES
JUDICATA.

For months the City Councilman in charge of the Police
Department pleaded with Ward to soften his regimentation toward
his subordinates

(R. 250 and 251) .

In the opinion by Judge

Winder granting Richfield summary judgment in a civil rights
action, the Federal District Court ruled that Ward had not been
deprived of a liberty interest (pp. 7 and 8, Decision of United
States District Court, July 11, 1983, attached as Appendix v.l
and v.2).
A judgment or decree rendered by a Federal Court of
competent jurisdiction, as to issues litigated on the merits, is
res judicata.

50 C.J.S. p. 518, Judgments §899, just as a State

Court judgment is res judicata in the Federal Court
522).

(Id. at p.

Federal Court judgments are entitled in the courts of any

state to the same effect, respect and conclusiveness as would be
accorded under similar circumstances to the judgments of a state
tribunal of equal authority.

50 C.J.S. p. 531, Judgments §901.

A Federal Court judgment is conclusive and undisputable as to all
points and issues adjudicated in the Federal Court action.
Id. p. 534, sub-section b.)
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(§901

In

Curry

vs.

Educoa

Preschool

Inc.,

580

P . 2d

224,

this

Court stated:
We hold that the involuntary dismissal of the
plaintiff's case in the federal court, on the
court's own motion, constitutes a final
judgment on the merits; which judgment is
entitled to res judicata effect.
As such, it
is a bar to a subsequent action involving the
same issues in the courts of Utah.
Therefore, the matter of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is
a matter decided on its merits in the Federal District Court to
the extent that Ward's dismissal was not malicious or in wanton
disregard of any of Ward's rights.
Under the "traditions of fair play" stated in Berube,
no member of the city government (other than the police officers
whose complaints are described hereinabove) has ever, at any
time,

officially

or unofficially

published,

communicated, or

promulgated any statement, declaration, release of information as
news,

or made

any

representation,

or

discredited,

other

disclosure,

utterance,

criticized,

written

subjected

to

statement, declaration,
or

unwritten,

hatred,

ridicule, or impugned the integrity of Ward.

which

contempt,

or

One of the purposes

for calling the "executive session" was to avoid publication or
dissemination of any comment, any statement, or declaration which
would discredit Ward.

A policy of careful endeavor to avoid

criticism of Ward, either publicly or privately, by Richfield,
its elected and appointed officials, and anyone in the employ of
Richfield has been pursued at all times.
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(R. 248 - 254)

All members were present at all times during the entire
meetings of April 2 and June 8, 1981.

At no time was the

personal characteristics, integrity, reputation, trustworthiness,
morality, honesty, or Ward's reputation for any of the same,
discussed or disclosed except for the ability of Ward to lead and
obtain the confidence of the police officers serving under Ward,
which ability was adversely commented upon and criticized.
Prior
Councilman

to

April

in charge

Richfield, made

2,

1981,

Duane

of the Department

statements

Wilson,

(Id.)

the

City

of Public Safety of

in defense of the activities and

performance of Ward as chief of police and defended openly and by
words and

conduct

against charges made against Ward

of his

incapability of cultivating confidence and to lead his men, which
charges were brought against him by members of the police force
and mentioned in City Council meetings.
made

many

statements

to

the

effect

Defendant Duane Wilson
that

Ward

was

a

"good

administrator" and the members of the City Council and the Mayor
unanimously

expressed

administrator"

but

the

lacked

opinion
qualities

that

Ward

which

was

would

a

"good

inspire

or

galvanize loyalty to the police force or to Richfield in matters
affecting morale of the police officers.

(R. 248)

It is difficult to prove a negative proposition, i.e.:
that a conspiracy did not exist.

However, here is positive

evidence that a conspiracy could not have existed because of the
objective, overt act of the governing body to choose a councilman
who was not opposed to Ward as chief of police.
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There can be no conspiracy where the acts complained
of, and the means employed in doing the acts, are lawful.

16

Am.Jur.2d p. 267, Conspiracy, §49 (citing both federal and state
cases).

CONCLUSION
The City has acted in good faith in compliance with the
law applicable to cities and governmental subdivisions in 1981.
In fact, its conduct meets all the standards of the Berube case
and decisions which that benchmark decision has produced.
Ward repeats incessantly a claim that Richfield City
had Policies and Procedures for termination but he produces none.
Failing that, he falls back upon a State statute which expressly
excludes policemen and department heads.

Under Ward's theory the

only person who could terminate Ward was Ward.
Richfield has done nothing wrong.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN

Ken Chamberlain
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

36

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing
Brief of Respondents were mailed to Mr. George E. Brown, Jr.,
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant, 7001 South 900 East, Suite
240,

Midvale,

Utah

(84047),

by

U.S.

prepaid, on this 1st day of March, 1990.
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regular

mail,

postage

Kule 65A. Injunctions.
(a) Preliminary; notice. No preliminary injunction shall be issued without
notice to the adverse party.
(b) Temporary restraining order; notice; rehearing; duration. No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the adverse party
unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.
Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be endorsed
with the date and hour of issuance; and shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's
office and entered of record; shall define the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and shall expire by its
terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes,
unless within the time sofixedthe order, for good cause shown, is extended for
a like period or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents
that it may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for the extension
shall be entered of record. In case a temporary restraining order is granted
without notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set down for
hearing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence of all matters
except older matters of the same character; and when the motion comes on for
hearing the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall proceed
with the application for a preliminary injunction and, if he does not do so, the
court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. On 2 days' notice to the
party who obtained the temporary restraining order without notice or on such
shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may
appear and move its dissolution or modification and in that event the court
shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends
of justice require.
(c) Security. Except as otherwise provided by law, no restraining order or
preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the
applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such
costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to
have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. No such security shall be required of the United States, the state of Utah, or of an officer, agency, or
subdivision of either; nor shall it be required of a married person in a suit
against the other party to the marriage contract.
A surety upon a bond or undertaking under this rule submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as his
agent upon whom any papers affecting his liability on the bond or undertaking may be served. His liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of the motion as the
court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court who shall forthwith
mail copies to the persons giving the security if their addresses are known.
(d) Form and scope of injunction or restraining order; service. Every
order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall be specific in
terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or
otherwise.
(e) Grounds for injunction. An injunction may be granted:
(1) when it appears by the pleadings on file that a party is entitled to
the relief demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of some act complained of, either
for a limited period or perpetually;
(2) when it appears from the pleadings or by affidavit that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce great
or irreparable injury to the party seeking injunctive relief;
(3) when it appears during the litigation that either party is doing or
threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some
act in violation of the rights of another party respecting the subject matter of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual;
(4) in all other cases where an injunction would be proper in equity.

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

BOYD A. WARD,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

ORDER
C i v i l No. 8626

RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal
Corporation, et al,
Defendant.

The Plaintiff and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgments
on stipulated facts came before the Court on July 30, 1986.
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied.

The Defendant's

Objection to Bill of Costs is Denied, except for the amount of the
cash bond which has been returned by Court Order to Plaintiff.
The Court finds that in accordance with 10-6-32 UCA, the law in
effect at the time of this case*the term of the Chief of Police of a
Third Class City shall be until the municipal election next following
his appointment, unless sooner removed by the Mayor with the concurrence
of a majority of members of the City Council, or by the City Council with
the concurrence of the mayor.
The Court finds that Richfield City called a public meeting;
that the agenda delivered to the news media, did not have on it any
information concerning the termination of the Police Chief; that the
City Council went into executive session during the public meeting

-2-

and later reconvened to announce the Police Chief termination.
Section 52-4-3 UCA provides that meetings should be open to
the public.

Section 52-4-8 provides that any final action taken in vio-

lation of Section 52-4-3 and Section 52-4-6 is voidable by a Court of
competent jurisdiction.
The absence of an item of business on the Agenda does not preclude
its consideration.

The "sunshine law" 52-4-1 UCA etc., provides that

meetings are open to the public.
news media.

The agenda is to be delivered to the

The penalty for violation is voidable by a Court of competent

jurisdiction.

Tie act does not establish any right to be heard or to

participate in debate, or to be represented by witnesses or legal council.
The purpose of the act is informational in its objective and does not
provide a procedural process for persons affected by legislative acts
of the Council except as above stated.
The Court finds that it would not be in the public interest to
void the action taken by the Richfield City Council on April 2, 1981, and
as ratified by it in a June 8, 1981 meeting.
The only issue the Plaintiff in this case could litigate is whether
or not the Mayor and Counsel voted to terminate him, and the affidavits
filed in this case conclusively stated they did and they thereby dispose
of that issue.
The Court finds that the dismissal was not malicious or in wanton
disregard of Plaintiff's rights.

Occupational Job Title:

CHIEF OP POLICE

Position Purpose:
The Chief of Police is the chief executive officer
of the Department and the final departmental authority
in all imttera of policy, operations, and discipline.
He exercises a^.l lawful powers of his office and
issues such lav/ful orders as are necessary to assure
the effective performance of the Department, He
shall c'irect and control the City's needs for police
interests and demands.
Responsibilities:
The Chief of Police commensurate, within policy
guidelines and legal constraints, has the authority
to coordinate and direct assigned personnel and other
allocated resources in achieving his organizational
objectives. In so doing, he must perform the full
range of administration functions, relying upon policy
direction, training and personal initiative to guide
him and the Department.
He shall be responsible through the Department, for
the enforcement of all laws coming within its legal
jurisdiction. The Chief of Police is responsible for
planning, directing, coordinating, controlling and
staffing of all activities of the Department for its
continued and efficient operation, for the completion
and forwarding of such reports as may be required
by competent authority and for the Department relations
with the citizens we serve as well as with outside
agencies.

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
bate
Subject
Effective Date

Policy No, 2

January 1, 1979
Definitions
January 1, 1979

This directive shall supersede all other departmental
policies dealing with definitions.
Policies and Procedures*
Written directives issued at *Vpartnental level by
the Chiei. Policies and Prooeeures remain in full
force and effect until amiv.ended, superseded or
cancelled by the issuing authority. Departmental
Policies an3 Procedures establish policy, procedures
or regulations governing matters which affect the
entire Department. They are the most authoritlve
directive issued in the Department end may be used to
ammen3, supersede, or cancel c*ny other rule, regulation,
or order.
Speqlal Orders:
written Directives issued at Departmental or Divisional
level by th^ Chief or a command officer. They specify*
instructions governing particular situations. Special
Orders are automatically cancelled when their objectives
are achieved.
Departmental Memoranda:
Information bulletins, containing suggestions, notices,
or official announcements of general interest*

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
Date
Subject
Effective Date

Policy NO. 10

January 1, 1979
Departmental Discipline
January 1, 1979

This directive shall supersede all other departmental policies*
dealing with departmental discipline.
Persons Subject to Disciplinary Action
A.

Any officer who violates his trust by committing
any offense punishable under the l^ws, ordinances, or
statutes of the United States, the State of Utah, the City
of Richfield; or who violates any provisions Qf the Rules
and Regulations of the Richfield City Police Department; or
who disobeys any lawful order; or who is incompetent to
perform his duties? is subject to appropriate disciplinary
action.

B.

The word "discipline" is a derivative of the latin word
"disciplina"* meaning instruction or education. The
purpose of discipline is to facilitate coordination of
effort. Positive discipline is an inner personal desire to
observe and follow the regulations and procedures of an
organisation. Negative discipline is compliance through
fear of punishment or penalty. It is the hope that all
officers will exercise positive discipline.

C.

Penalties - Subject to the aoproval of the Chief of Police,
the following penalties may be imposed against any
officer or employee of the Department as disciplinary

action:
1)
2)
4)
5)

Verbal r eP*-' J * nd Hr 4 , ~ e n r o * n r i m a n d Suspension*
Demotion.
Dismissal.

Departmental Authority to Discipline
D.

Pinal departmental disciplinary authority and responsibility
rests with the Chief of Police* Except for verbal
reprimands and emergency suspensions, all departmental
discipline must be taken or approved by the Chief of
Police.

E. Other supervisory personnel may take the following
disciplinary measures:
1) Verbal reprimand.
2) Written reprimand (subject to approval by the commanding
officer)•
3) Emergency suspensions.
4) Written recommendations for other penalties.
P.

Emergency Suspension - Any command or supervisory officer
has the authority to impose emergency suspension until the
next business day against an officer or employee when it is
apparent that such action is in the best interest of the
Department.

G.

Pollow-Up Action on Emergency Suspension - An officer or
employee receiving an emergency suspension shall be
required to report to the Chief of Police on the next business
day at 1000 hours (10:00 a.m.) unless otherwise directed
by competent authority. The command or supervisory officer
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in continued employment and no constitutional deprivation could
have occurred. See Bishop v. Wood, supra? Board of Regents v.
Roth, supra.
This court must also determine whether the plaintiff
has been deprived of a liberty interest.

It is undisputed that

the following news release was formulated by the city council
upon the termination of the plaintiff:
In a meetinq between the Richfield City Chief
of Police and the Richfield City Council on
Thursday, April 2, 1981# Boyd Wardf Richfield
City Chief of Police, was relieved of duty
effective April 3, 1981. It was felt by the
Mayor and the Council that internal problems
in the department made this change necessary.
The plaintiff also refers this court to a newspaper
article which appeared in the Deseret News April 4, 1981.
article reads in pertinent part:
RICHFIELD - Richfield Police Chief Boyd
Ward has been relieved of his-post by the
city Council.
Mayor Kendrick Harwood was not available
for comment Friday, but a Councilman said
there had been internal problems in the
police department along with criticism and
letters to the editor in a local newspaper
that led to the firing.

The councilman praised Ward for his
administration (sic) ability and "buildinq a
fine police department," however.

Ward declined comment on his firing.
•

The
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The statement about the plaintiff being terminated for
internal problems in the interview with a council member has,
according to the plaintiff, caused siqnificant damage in that the
plaintiff has been unable to refute the accusation against him in
order to find a new position as chief of police in another
community.

This court is aware that the Supreme Court held in

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), that the
dismissal of a chief of police accompanied by charqes that miaht
damage his reputation, without the benefit of a hearina, amounts
to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.

Lookina

to the undisputed facts of this case, however, it is clear to
this court that this is not a case where the plaintiff's
interests in liberty have been implicated.

The council did not

relieve him of his position as chief of police on a charqe that
he had been guilty of dishonesty or immorality, nor does this
court see any indication whatever that the plaintiff's good name,
reputation, honor or integrity is at stake.

See Board of Regents

v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.'
the plaintiff to be true, under the

StanSsaOUZA

Supreme Court this courtsfiiids ,W5liflf1
arising from the actions of the city eouiUflftV'
It follows that if there has been no deprivation of
property rights or liberty interests, there can be no actionable
conspiracy.

It is axiomatic that there can be no cause of action

